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The Social Structure of Consecration in Cultural Fields:  
The Influence of Status and Social Distance in Audience-Candidate Evaluative Processes  
 
Abstract 
 
Building on sociological research that examines the allocation of rewards in peer evaluations, we argue 
that the recognition of cultural producers’ work varies with their status and social distance from the 
audience members who evaluate them. We study the influence of these two mechanisms within the 
context of the Norwegian advertising industry. Specifically, we looked at how cultural producers’ 
status and social distance from jury members affect their chances of being honored in “The Silver 
Tag” – one of the main digital advertising awards contests in Norway – during the period 2003-2010. 
While our findings provide support for status-based rewards allocation, the positive effects of status 
may be more circumscribed than previously thought. When accounting for the existence of previous 
connections between audience members and cultural producers, we find that cultural producers are 
more or less likely to receive an accolade depending on their degree of separation from the audience 
members. By exposing network-based determinants of consecrating decisions, and suggesting that the 
positive effects of status may be more circumscribed than previously thought our findings shed 
important light on the social foundations of evaluation and, more broadly, the mechanisms of reward 
allocation in cultural fields. 
 
Keywords: Peer evaluation, status, social distance, awards, tournament rituals, consecration, 
advertising. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The reception of cultural producers and their offers has long been center stage in sociology. In any 
cultural field, whether art or science, cultural producers are engaged in an ongoing struggle to secure 
notoriety, prestige, and esteem. In this struggle to define what counts as culturally legitimate, acts of 
cultural consecration are critical because they identify a select few individuals and products that 
deserve special esteem and approbation by conferring honors, awards and prizes (Becker, 1982; 
Bourdieu, 1993; Cole & Cole, 1967; Crane, 1976; Goode, 1978; Lamont, 1987; Merton, 1957). 
Consecration is important in virtually all fields of cultural production where distinctions are made to 
separate “individuals and their achievements that are worthy of admiration and respect from those 
that are not” (Allen & Lincoln, 2004: 872). These distinctions are typically revealed during tournament 
rituals in which field audiences with the authority to dispense symbolic capital disclose their 
preferences (Allen & Parsons, 2006; Rossman, Esparza, & Bonacich 2010; Cattani, Ferriani, & Allison, 
2014). Tournament rituals operate as a crucial mechanism for social stratification because they 
“construct prestige hierarchies that both enable and constrain actors’ abilities to form relationships 
with others in a field” (Anand & Watson, 2004: 76).  
Although acts of consecration should be governed by universalistic criteria associated with 
merit, achievement and performance, many studies have problematized this ideal by pointing to how 
socially derived criteria come to play a key role in evaluative processes (Cole, Cole, & Simon, 1981; 
Lamont, 2009; Karpik, 2010). Paramount among such accounts are those that emphasize the influence 
of “status beliefs”—beliefs that are discussed as valid in public displays of honor, and which rank 
individuals, types of people, or objects according to their expected ability to contribute to valued 
outcomes. By subtly shaping behavior, status beliefs create inequalities in attributions of ability, 
influence and situational rewards between otherwise equally deserving candidates (Ridgeway, 2014). 
There is vast evidence supporting this effect. In science, for instance, eminent scientists receive the 
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lion’s share of recognition often at the expense of lesser-known peers even for equivalent 
contributions—a misallocation of credit that Merton (1968) called “the Matthew Effect.” Field 
audiences, in fact, usually over-reward those of “considerable repute” and withhold credit from those 
who have “not yet made their mark” (Merton, 1968: 58). The same patterns of misallocation of credit 
can be observed across many fields of cultural production whenever high-status actors are seen as 
being preferred targets of interaction beyond the level that their superiority in quality truly deserves.  
In our view, belying the massive evidence that emphasizes the role of status beliefs in shaping 
audiences’ allocative choices is the comparative absence of scholarly work on the stratifying effects of 
interpersonal distance between audience members and candidates in the underlying social structure. 
Perhaps only a “sociological babe in the woods” (Granovetter, 1985: 502) would dispute the 
importance of social distance in catalyzing recognition. At least since Parsons and Shils’ (1951) 
characterization of universalism in terms of the social relationship that exists between evaluators 
(henceforth audience members) and prospective candidates, social ties have been considered central 
to our understanding of the mechanisms shaping resource allocation decisions. Surprisingly, though, 
the influence of these relationships has remained unattended in extant sociological research on 
consecration. Inattention to this dimension could be partly explained by a data issue: detailed 
information about underlying relationships between audience members and candidates is difficult to 
obtain. As a result, though openly recognizing it, the literature has largely downplayed the role of the 
audience-candidate social structure as a basis for the allocation of valued symbolic and material 
resources and – to the best of our knowledge – has failed to investigate it empirically.  
This shortcoming appears especially critical in peer-evaluation settings in which efforts to 
expose status-based inequalities tend to dominate the scene. First, since in peer evaluation settings 
social networks are profoundly shaped by one’s status, it is difficult to avoid situations where one is 
evaluating the work of someone with whom she is directly or indirectly affiliated (Cattani and Ferriani, 
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2014). An account of identity construction that relies solely on status–based processes, therefore, 
would be fundamentally incomplete. Second, high status could actually suggest that the candidate is 
an insider to the élite group responsible for the allocation of rewards. In academic evaluation systems, 
for example, evaluators are usually established and highly embedded scholars who “often favor their 
own type of research while being firmly committed to rewarding the strongest proposal” (Lamont, 
2009: 9). Third, insofar as social audiences’ reliance on status reflects their attempt to deal with the 
uncertainty of judging the quality of their peers’ work, social ties should mitigate the saliency of such 
a judgment device. They do so by rendering audience members less sensitive to signals encoded in 
publicly observable status hierarchies (as revealed, for instance, by the attainment of previous honors 
or network position). 
Thus, several unattended questions require more careful consideration among scholars 
concerned with the social foundations of evaluation and the mechanisms of reward allocation in 
cultural fields. To what extent does social distance between audience members and cultural producers 
affect the allocation of symbolic capital? Do ties to audience members enhance cultural producers’ 
likelihood of receiving an accolade? What is the impact of cultural producers’ status relative to their 
social distance from audience members?  
To address these questions, we collected data on the Norwegian advertising field from 2003 
to 2010. According to the IRM Institute for Advertising & Media Statistics, the Norwegian advertising 
field was the fifth largest in the world in terms of investments per capita in 2000 and the second largest 
in terms of investments per capita in 2009. Like in other fields of cultural production (e.g., Cole & 
Cole, 1967; Cattani & Ferriani, 2008), advertising excellence in this context is assessed in awards 
competitions by juries of professional peers. Advertising contests underscore the creative and aesthetic 
nature of advertising and enhance the cultural capital of the winners (Alvesson, 1994). The jury 
members are typically accomplished advertising professionals who specialized in the same advertising 
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categories as the contest participants. In this role, jury members not only judge the work of their peers 
but also contribute to defining the criteria by which their work eventually is evaluated. Becoming a 
jury member thus provides an opportunity to shape the criteria guiding the allocation of symbolic 
capital and the offers (here advertising projects) that are rewarded. And because the industry is project-
based, we can infer interpersonal ties indirectly, by studying secondary yearly data on collaborations 
of individuals across projects. Following this approach, we use collaboration data for competing 
advertising projects eligible for one of the most coveted prizes in the industry to construct a rich 
longitudinal database of interpersonal connections among all advertising professionals since 2003. 
This forms the basis of creating a social proximity graph for almost 2000 unique individuals, which is 
then used to gauge the social distance between any two professionals.  We capitalize on these industry 
features to test the often suggested, but yet untested, hypothesis that the social distance between 
audience (jury) members and producers (project participants) matters for reward decisions. Finally, we 
examine the relative impact of producers’ status when controlling for social distance.   
Our analyses reveal the existence of status advantages in rewards allocation contests. This is 
our baseline hypothesis. Even though previous studies have shown the importance of status in shaping 
evaluative outcomes, establishing whether it holds also in our setting is important for meaningfully 
investigating the relative influence of social distance. Besides, unlike prevailing accounts of status-
based mechanisms that look at advantages originating from preferential treatment of high-status 
producers before observing their performance (i.e., pre-consumption evaluation), we focus instead on 
the case in which audience members evaluate producers (including high-status producers) ex post, 
namely after observing their performance (the quality of the advertising project competing in a 
monthly contest). Next, we find that social distance matters in shaping the outcome of audiences’ 
evaluations; in absolute terms, its effect is also greater than the effect of status. Further explorative 
analyses suggest that the likelihood that producers are rewarded tends to diminish as the social distance 
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between them and members of the evaluating audience continues to decline. Although not originally 
hypothesized, we believe that this result should stimulate researchers to further probe the nature and 
consequences of social distance for consecration decisions in peer-based tournament rituals. We 
conclude by speculating on the theoretical and the empirical basis for this unexpected curvilinear effect 
in the discussion. 
THE ALLOCATION OF SYMBOLIC CAPITAL IN TOURNAMENT RITUALS 
In cultural fields, acts of consecration usually take place in award ceremonies known as tournaments 
rituals where awards are conferred upon cultural producers through the selective judgment of worth. 
Tournament rituals have a distinct and recognizable symbolic structure that, in some culturally defined 
way, is removed from the routines of economic life, usually taking the form of a public spectacle 
(Appadurai, 1986). By channelling ceremonial judgments through honors and awards, these rituals 
operate as arenas in which struggles for peer recognition between established and emergent actors 
unfold. What is at stake in such rituals, however, is not just rank, fame or reputation, but “the 
disposition of the central tokens of value in the society in question” (Appadurai, 1986: 21) or, in other 
words, the very definition of what constitutes ‘value’ in a field. As a ritualistic representation of a field’s 
value, conferring honors represents a powerful mechanism of control and social reproduction (Anand 
& Watson, 2004: 60). As Taylor (1987: 145) notes, the formal conferring of honor is “especially 
important for maintaining legitimacy of the élite” and reinforcing the status position of its members. 
Similarly, Goode (1978) argues that the allocation of honors reflect conscious decisions by an élite 
whose members devote preferential attention to high-status individuals or individuals to whom they 
are connected. By rewarding actors with whom they have prior network contacts, in fact, élites 
reproduce their own power.  
Status and Rewards 
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Status shapes audience members’ expectations about the performance of candidates, especially when 
ascertaining the quality of this performance is surrounded with uncertainty (e.g., Benjamin & Podolny, 
1999; Sauder et al., 2012). To deal with this uncertainty, audience members tend to rely on status 
markers – e.g., network position, deference patterns in relationships, rankings or the reward choices 
of prior decision-makers – that are believed to correlate with quality when they make allocative 
choices. Research on status characteristics and expectation states has found supporting evidence for 
this effect in experimental studies (Ridgeway & Berger, 1986). Indeed, these studies suggest that status-
based advantages accumulate when certain status characteristics “invoke expectations of performance 
from evaluators, which in turn shapes the perception of the candidates being judged so that evaluators 
‘see’ quality” (Kim & King, 2014: 2620).  
The previous studies emphasize how audience members tend to rely on status as a signal of 
quality to reduce the uncertainty of their evaluations before observing candidates’ performance (i.e., 
pre-consumption evaluation). Here, we focus instead on the case in which audience members observe 
that performance before assessing it and yet remain uncertain about its underlying quality. This type 
of uncertainty is common to all those situations where different evaluators interpret the same output 
differently, due to the coexistence of diverse subjective attributes of quality. For instance, consider the 
difference between search and experience goods (Darby & Karni, 1973). In the case of a search good 
(e.g., a computer), prospective buyers can assess all the features about which they care prior to 
purchasing that good. By contrast, buyers can only evaluate experience goods (e.g., movies) through 
consumption and still defining what constitutes a good movie post-consumption is open to 
interpretation due to the variety of subjective dimensions used to assess cinematic quality. Like in the 
case of pre-consumption evaluation, audience members may rely on status signals to alleviate the post-
consumption uncertainty that shapes evaluation under the circumstances just described.  
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A few recent studies seem to support this view. For example, Waguespack and Sorenson 
(2011) show that rating boards tend to privilege movies (post-consumption evaluation) from high 
status studios by rating them more favorably. Kim and King (2014) further demonstrate that high 
status baseball players are more likely to benefit from umpires’ (referees’) judgment calls. Because 
subjectivity is likely to evoke accountability concerns among members of the evaluating audience as 
to how their judgments are perceived, anchoring on status markers makes it easier for them to justify 
their judgments, so leading to patterns of preferential rewards allocation. Regardless of audience 
members’ (subjective) view of quality, the choice of high-status candidates is more easily defensible in 
front of other peer evaluators because it is based on what is publicly recognized as high quality (Correll 
et al., 2017). In situations such as those described above, status provides a means by which audience 
members can coordinate their evaluations. Accordingly, our baseline hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1: In peer (post consumption) evaluation, cultural producers’ work is more likely to be honored when 
their level of status increases. 
Social Distance and Rewards 
Peer audiences have the authority to determine the legitimate definition of a given type of work by 
selectively allocating prestige (e.g., resources, awards and honors) to some works but not others 
(Cattani et al., 2014). Our central argument is that the outcome of these peer-based evaluations is likely 
to map on the social structure underlying the interface between the audience and the producers under 
evaluation. Because peer audiences are élite representatives of a given field they tend to define 
excellence as “what is most like me” (Lamont, 2009) and concede a disproportionate amount of 
symbolic (as well as material) resources to those members of the field who are more likely to embrace 
the same canons, even when they have no intention to favor them. Thus, to the extent that social 
distance affects the emergence of a common identity and the transmission of shared canons (Cattani, 
Ferriani, Negro & Perretti, 2008), it then follows that audience members will be more inclined to 
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reward candidates with whom they have few degrees of separation. For instance, in academic panels 
for research funding the influence of social ties cannot be totally eliminated from the evaluation 
process because panelists “are frequently asked to adjudicate the work of individuals with whom they 
have only a few degrees of separation” (Lamont, 2009: 8-9; emphasis added). While the formal rules of 
funding agencies explicitly require panelists to abstain from participating in funding decisions when 
the work of close colleagues, friends, or collaborators is evaluated, some panelists may still volunteer 
information – e.g., “this student’s mentor is a close collaborator of mine” or “I know this applicant’s 
adviser very well and trust her letter” (Lamont, 2009: 126-127).  
Additionally, social distance may act as a judgment device (e.g., Karpik, 2010; Lamont, 2012) that 
affects uncertainty in social evaluations. Judgment devices are tools that are crucial for understanding 
the construction of value, particularly in the case of unique products that escape easy evaluation. 
Drawing from affect heuristic theory, some psychologists explain this form of social inference arguing 
that the brain encodes expectations that alleviate the cognitive burden of evaluating ambiguous 
situations analytically (e.g., Zajonc, 1980). This is, for instance, the case when the object of evaluation 
is characterized by technical and/or artistic complexity (Lang & Lang, 1988; Podolny & Stuart, 1995) 
or when there is considerable disagreement on quality standards (Greenfield, 1989). In light of the 
previous arguments, we thus hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: In peer (post consumption) evaluation, cultural producers’ work is more likely to be honored as 
their social distance to members of the evaluating audience decreases. 
 
Empirical Setting 
We tested the previous hypotheses on the allocation of symbolic capital within the context of the 
Norwegian advertising industry. Like in many other fields of cultural production, advertising 
excellence is usually assessed in awards contests. The contestants competing in these tournaments are 
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evaluated by juries whose members are professional peers who specialize in the same advertising 
categories as the contestants. Typically, jury members are professionals who were consecrated (won) 
in previous competitions and so are the ‘custodians’ of the dominant field canons (Bourdieu, 1993). 
Given the project-based nature of the advertising industry – with many freelance professionals 
transitioning from project to project over time – it is not uncommon for jury members to have 
collaborated with peers whom they end up evaluating later on (Jones, 1996; Ferriani, Cattani, & Baden-
Fuller, 2009). Jury members are in fact part of the field’s collaborative network structure and more 
closely connected to some peers than others. As a result of these interpersonal relationships, the 
identity of the contestants is likely to affect jury deliberations.  
 “The Silver Tag” is one of the main digital advertising award contests in the Norwegian 
advertising field. The contest is organized by INMA, a non-profit interest organization that works for 
the advancement and utilization of digital advertising media. Submitting projects to the contest is free 
of charge and open to all as long as the work is produced in Norway. Contestants can submit online 
their project to a given contest month via INMA’s “The Silver Tag” website. All projects must be 
submitted with the following information: advertising agency identities, team participants’ identities, 
participants’ occupational titles, client name, a brief description of the project and its goals, media mix 
and advertising placements. All participants and their projects are broadcast industry-wide and subject 
to scrutiny by any interested party. Consequently, this monthly contest provided the opportunity to 
gather very detailed data and track interpersonal relationships in the field at a fairly high level of 
accuracy over time. As the submission deadline for a given monthly contest expires, the jury members 
have a few days to inspect the competing projects individually before they convene to deliberate and 
identify the winner—usually in the middle of the subsequent month. The winner is then announced 
and celebrated in industry media. “The Silver Tag” website also serves as an archive of previous 
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contest months, where any interested party can browse both winners and losers for all previous 
months. 
“The Silver Tag” is set up with a jury consisting of professionals primarily from advertising 
agencies. INMA changes the composition of the jury members in May each year. INMA also sets the 
evaluation criteria the jury members are expected to use to award projects for digital advertising 
campaigns. Specifically, winning projects should be selected “based on solid creative ideas, exploiting 
opportunities in the media, innovative work that transcends boundaries, ideas that engage and involve 
the user and that create enthusiasm, aesthetics, use of advertising formats, choice of technology, 
relevant use of interactivity and strategy, and how it all relates to the brand” (www.solvtaggen.no ). 
The jury evaluation process proceeds as follows. All jury members produce a personal shortlist of their 
5 favourite projects. These shortlists are subsequently compiled to identify the jury’s shortlist of 5 
projects. Next, each project on this shortlist is discussed by the jury where each jury member argues 
for his or her preferred winner. The jury president manages the discussion. Qualities that jurors value 
in an advertising campaign are: funny, original and innovative; revealing good craftsmanship in terms 
of aesthetic appearance; using interactive media technologies.  
After discussing the shortlist, the jury members assign points to the different projects and the 
ranking is established by adding up the jurors’ points and averaging them. If necessary, the winner is 
identified with several decimals. Besides identifying the winner, the jury has the “opportunity to 
bestow an honorable mention to work that in its opinion it has solved or contributed something in a 
very good way, to which it is desirable to grant extra attention” (www.inma.no). Honorable mentions 
are typically bestowed in rank order from two (2nd place) to five (5th place). Whenever jury members 
have a conflict of interest – e.g., they were involved in a project that was submitted to the contest or 
an advertising agency for which they were working submitted a project – they are not allowed to 
partake in the evaluation of that project: they have to exit the jury room and wait in the hallway while 
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the project is being discussed. For this project, the score of the juror with a conflict of interest is set 
equal to the average of the other jurors’ scores. Once the jury members determine the ranking and 
agree on the winning project, the jury issues a justification – drafted by the jury president – that 
accompanies the announcement in industry media. 
Data 
To identify organizations and professionals competing for symbolic recognition in the Norwegian 
digital advertising field, we collected data on all projects entered into “The Silver Tag” from May 2003 
to April 2010. The data were available from the online “The Silver Tag” archive published by INMA. 
The dataset is truly unique and comprises a total of 1,734 distinct individuals, 350 distinct 
organizations and 902 projects over 75 contest months.1 We collected data on all jury members in 
“The Silver Tag” awards contest from May 2003 to March 2010 from “The Silver Tag” website and 
industry press. Each jury served from May to April in the following year during the years 2003-2006 
and from April to March during the years 2006-2010. In total, we collected data on 7 juries, whose 
size over the study period varied from 4 (for the first jury) to 11 (for the last jury) members.  
Dependent variable 
We used a generalized linear approach to model the jury-project evaluation process, in which jury 
members bestow an accolade (award or honorable mention) on projects selected from among the 
larger set of projects eligible in a given month. This approach seems appropriate because we are 
estimating the outcome of the evaluation process where jurors cast their votes for their preferred 
candidate competing for recognition. We interpret this process as estimating the number of successes, 
                                                          
1  June/July each year was combined into one contest generation by the Norwegian interactive marketing interest 
organization responsible for the contest, INMA. In addition, INMA combined March/April 2004 and August/September 
2004 into two distinct contest generations. This practice produces a total of 11 competitions per year – without counting 
the aforementioned exceptions in 2004. 
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i.e. favorable juror votes, out of a given set of trials, i.e. the number of jurors voting. This means that 
for each competing project we estimate the favorable juror votes received, conditional on the number 
of jurors casting votes. In this process, each project faces a trial from each juror, and may succeed or 
fail at these trials. For each project facing evaluation trials by the jury members in a given month, we 
coded the dependent variable 1 if a project reached the 5th place; 2 if a project reached the 4th place; 
3 if a project reached the 3rd place, 4 if a project reached the 2nd place, and 5 if a project reached the 
1st place (i.e., won the award). For all remaining projects in the same contest month, we set the 
dependent variable equal to 0.  
It is worth remembering that, even though the accolade goes to the project, all individuals 
involved receive it as well. This scale for our dependent variable represents an approximation of the 
underlying voting process in which a fixed number of jurors cast their votes on each project, and some 
projects are favored by one or more jurors while others are not. The number of jurors in a given 
month defines the number of voting trials that each project faces. The actual jury evaluation process 
in “The Silver Tag” justifies this interpretation. In this process, all projects face a trial by each juror 
who individually scrutinizes each project. Each judge then compiles a shortlist of projects he or she 
favors. The jury the compile each jury members’ shortlist to make up the jury’s top 5 shortlist. The 
jurors then proceed to cast their votes to the projects on the jury's shortlist. The preferred winner 
receives 5 points, the preferred second place receives 4 points, and so on from each juror. The jury 
then adds up the points awarded by each juror and divides the sum by the number of jury members. 
The projects that do not make the shortlist receive zero votes and hence zero points.  
Independent variables 
To test our hypotheses, we measured the status of the project members and their social distance from 
jury members, respectively. Previous research has used network centrality to measure status (for a 
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review see Sauder et al., 2012). While awards reflect social esteem and respect, i.e., some form of public 
valuation, centrality pertains to a position of importance in a network. We, therefore, tested the first 
hypothesis by creating the variable status using Bonacich beta-centrality (Bonacich, 1987). The measure 
counts the number of individuals in the project with a Bonacich beta-centrality above the median in 
the global “Silver Tag” network over the total number of individuals working on the same project in 
a particular month contest based on a 24-month moving affiliation network window (see below). We 
also chose a more conservative cutoff to define high-status – i.e., values greater than .85 (for a similar 
approach see Jensen 2008) – which yielded very similar results. 
We tested our second hypothesis by computing the social distance measure between jury 
members and the individuals working on the same advertising project by first generating bipartite 
project affiliation network matrices based on the monthly “The Silver Tag” digital awards contest 
using the UCINET VI package (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002). A well-known issue in 
establishing the existence of a social connection is how long this connection should persist. Assuming 
no relationship decay over the study period would imply an overestimate of the number and duration 
of connections in the network by maintaining false ties to inactive professionals. However, given the 
fast-pace nature of the industry and, in particular, after our interviews with industry participants, it 
was unclear whether a professional not involved in any advertising projects for about 2 years should 
still be considered an active member of the industry. Accordingly, we created our adjacency matrices 
adopting a 24-month moving window that was updated monthly.2 Using these matrices, we calculated 
the median geodesic distance between each individual advertising project member and the peer jury 
members. This is tantamount to measuring degrees of separation in studies on small worlds. We 
grouped together individual producers with social distances from jurors equal to or greater than 6, and 
assigned them the value 6. This operationalization follows the six degrees of separation theory 
                                                          
2 Adopting a shorter (one year) or longer (3 years) moving time window yields very similar results. 
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according to which, by means of introduction, everyone is six degrees or fewer away from any other 
person in the world (Milgram, 1967). Thus, a chain of “a friend of a friend” statements can be made 
to connect any two people in a maximum of six steps. To facilitate the interpretation of the results, 
we measured social distance in terms of proximity between jury members and producers. We did so 
by computing the reciprocal of the median geodesic distance between each individual advertising 
project member and the peer jury members. As our unit of analysis is the project, we created the social 
proximity variable as the median of each project member’s median distance from jury members. 
Control variables 
To rule out alternative explanations for the hypothesized relationships, we included several control 
variables in our models. The main empirical challenge to test the actual effects of status, social distance 
and positive ties lies in disentangling their effects from those of other stratifying variables (Phillips & 
Zuckerman, 2001) such as the quality of the project under evaluation. Controlling for quality is also 
particularly important to determine the influence of personal bias in guiding evaluators’ decision (Lee 
et al., 2013). In contexts such as tournament rituals, where multiple candidates compete for the same 
award, one would expect candidates with direct ties to evaluators (jury members) to have better 
chances of being recognized. Controlling for quality would therefore attenuate the influence of such 
bias because the influence of our variables of theoretical interest is estimated net of project quality. 
However, our data do not allow us to measure project quality directly. During our interviews, field 
insiders pointed out how high-quality projects usually exhibit certain measurable characteristics that 
are strongly correlated with quality. First, high-quality projects tend to be technologically advanced 
and innovative in terms of technological application. With the diffusion of broadband technology and 
increasing downloading speeds, digital advertising professionals have now the opportunity to create 
more sophisticated creative solutions with visually appealing interactive content based on video/film, 
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sound, 3D animation and streaming technologies. Second, high-quality projects make use of ample 
resources in terms of budget size and work hours in order to develop more ambitious solutions. Larger 
projects, proxied by the number of project participants, also increase the likelihood that there are 
social ties between jury members and members of the project team. Although other unobserved 
characteristics might affect project quality, the technical sophistication of a project and the number of 
people working on it represent a reasonably good approximation of a project’s underlying quality.   
Project sophistication. Following the INMA criteria and jury statements, jury members typically 
emphasize whether the advertising projects competing in a given contest month use new technology. 
The creative use of technology is in fact perceived as a sign of technical sophistication and 
innovativeness. During our observation period, the application of technologies such as film, sound, 
3D and streaming enabled producers to develop more advanced, innovative and aesthetically pleasing 
projects. We thus created a variable – project sophistication – that differentiates projects based on the type 
of technologies that they employed. The variable tallies the number of agencies specializing in 3D-
animation, film production, radio production, or back-end streaming involved in a given project. 
Although this variable does not capture the actual use of new technologies, it discriminates projects 
for which the producers had at least the opportunity to leverage those technologies from projects for 
which this opportunity was unavailable. In other words, the variable captures the ‘potential’ technical 
sophistication of a project. Also, the variable does not simply reflect jury members’ perceived level of 
sophistication, which then reduces the risk that purely subjective considerations might be driving jury 
members’ decisions.  
Project size. A larger number of project participants serve as a proxy for larger project budgets 
and a higher number of hours available in the project to create more ambitious solutions. This variable 
also controls for the likelihood that social connections between jury members and cultural producers 
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may increase with the size of the project team. Accordingly, we controlled for the total number of 
individuals on each digital advertising project. 
Conflict of interest. As we mentioned before, whenever jury members have a conflict of interest, 
they are not allowed to partake in the evaluation of that project. One such case is when both project 
and jury members work for the same firm. Another case is when jurors are participating in projects 
they are supposed to evaluate. In this case, they literally wear two hats: one as jurors, the other as 
contest participants. To control for possible bias in the jury, we then generated an indicator variable 
that is equal to 1 if one or more project members had a colleague in the jury or a juror was a member 
of the project, and 0 otherwise. It is worth noting that the variable does not measure prior 
collaborations but only employment in the same firm or project co-membership. 
Median experience. Project members’ past experience with digital advertising projects might 
account for their differential ability to contribute to the project as well as understand what exactly jury 
members are looking for in a project. We then tallied the number of projects prior to the focal project 
that each producer entered into “The Silver Tag” contest. For each project, we then calculated the 
median experience of all producers involved. 
Competitive intensity. The more projects compete for recognition in a given contest month, the 
more intense the competition and the lower the likelihood that a given project will win. We therefore 
counted the number of projects competing for recognition in each contest month to control for 
project concentration. 
Prior jurors on project. As mentioned before, jurors serve in their position on average for 12 
months (i.e., 11 monthly contests). As active members of the advertising field, upon terminating their 
mandate former jurors typically continue participating in the contest. The presence of one or more 
former jurors on a project might affect the odds that such a project will receive an accolade depending 
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on how favorably those jurors evaluated the projects in which the newly appointed jury members were 
involved. 
Prior positive co-experience. The second hypothesis suggests that the allocation of rewards does 
not occur in a social void, but is instead embedded in patterns of connections between audience 
members and the producers they evaluate. As they convey information about producers and their 
work, those ties can be positive or negative and, therefore, a source of social benefits or liabilities 
(Labianca & Brass, 2006). Individuals occupying the same structural position (e.g., same degree of 
separation from members of the evaluating audience) might in fact have different odds of recognition 
depending on whether their ties are positive or neutral (if not negative). Especially when such ties 
stem from prior experience working together, the success of previous collaborations might enhance 
positive affect in interpersonal relationships and so shape future evaluative interactions. Positive ties 
can thus give rise to a ‘content-based’ bias (Lee et al., 2013: 8), whereby evaluators assess more 
favorably the work of producers with whom they co-created successful material in the past. For 
instance, this form of cognitive particularism or ‘cognitive cronyism’ (Travis & Collins, 1991) in peer 
review occurs more subtly than simply evaluation in bad faith, like when manifest personal interests 
affect evaluation. In subjective contexts, where objective assessment criteria are often lacking or 
disputed, we therefore expect audience members to be more likely to honor the work of candidates 
with whom they have positive ties over the work of proximate candidates who do not have such ties. 
We computed the prior positive co-experience measure between current jury members and project 
members on each project subject to jury evaluation by tracking their past successful collaborative 
experiences in “The Silver Tag” over the past 24-months. Specifically, we counted the number of 
current jurors who had worked together with current project members on digital advertising projects 
in “The Silver Tag” in the past and won the contest. We created the indicator variable prior positive co-
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experience for which we assigned a value of 1 if there were one or more such instances for a given 
project and 0 if there were no such instances. 
METHOD 
We modeled the probability of each project receiving more points, i.e., more favorable evaluations by 
the jurors in the jury in a given contest month, using generalized linear models (McCullagh and Nelder, 
1989; Hardin and Hilbe, 2012). We estimated our models with the glm command in Stata 14, specifying 
the binomial family and set the binomial denominator equal to the number of jurors evaluating the 
competing projects in each month. We also specified the logit link and estimated our models with 
maximum likelihood, clustering the projects on each contest month to obtain robust standard errors. 
We modeled the probability of peer jury members favoring a given project creating an aggregate 
outcome for each project of either no placement, 5th place, 4th place, 3rd place, 2nd place or 1st place in 
a given contest month. We also clustered projects on firm, but the results were qualitatively similar to 
those reported here (see below). 
RESULTS 
The descriptive statistics and correlations for our measures are presented in Tables 1 and 2, 
respectively. We first checked the correlations among all independent and control variables and found 
no evidence of multicollinearity. The condition number (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980) for the matrix 
of independent variables was 9.90. This value as well as the singular values ranging between 1 and 9.90 
were all well below the suggested threshold of 30. The low condition numbers suggest that 
multicollinearity is not likely to be an issue in our models.  
<Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here> 
We began by estimating a model with robust standard errors in which the only predictors were, 
respectively, status and social proximity (the two variables of theoretical interest). The model stratifies by 
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contest month, so each stratum corresponds to a choice set for the jury in a particular month. In 
Model 1 of Table 3, the coefficient for status was 1.088 (p<.01), while in Model 2 the coefficient for 
social proximity was 5.270 (p<.01). These results suggest that jury members favor projects created by 
higher status professionals as well as projects created by professionals with whom they are socially 
proximate.  
Next, we introduced our control variables as shown in Model 3 of Table 3. While project size, 
project sophistication, competitive intensity, and conflict of interest were significant and the sign of their 
coefficient in the expected direction, prior jurors on project and prior positive co-experience were not 
statistically significant. 
When all these variables were controlled for (Model 4), the coefficient of the status variable 
was in the expected positive direction (.656) and highly significant (p<.01), suggesting that higher 
status projects are more likely to receive an accolade. Similarly, the coefficient of the social proximity 
variable (Model 5) was highly significant (p<.01) and in the expected positive direction (4.072): a 
project is more likely to receive an accolade as the social proximity between project and jury members 
increases. When the two variables of interest were included in the same model (Model 6), the 
connectivity measure was highly significant and the sign of its coefficient in the expected direction. 
The, the status measure was still positive and significant at the 5% level.  
To facilitate comparisons across different variables, Figure 1 shows the percentage change in 
the odds of receiving an accolade after exponentiating the standardized coefficient of the variables 
used in the analysis for 1-standard deviation variation. Besides confirming the strong impact of the 
variables project size and project sophistication that serve as proxies for project quality, the figure shows 
that the two variables of theoretical interest – status and social proximity – strongly affect the dependent 
variable. Increasing status by 1-standard deviation increases the odds of receiving an accolade by 22 
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percent. Similarly, increasing social proximity by 1-standard deviation increases the odds of receiving an 
accolade by 27 percent. 
We also explored the possibility that the effect of social proximity may not be linear as 
hypothesized. If in fact universalistic criteria of merit do shape evaluative outcomes, jury members 
should be sensitive to situations in which doubts could be cast on the objectivity and fairness of their 
decisions. Some field participants also insinuated this possibility during our interviews with them. 
Accordingly, we included the squared term for social proximity to probe the existence of a quadratic 
effect. In Model 7, the main (linear) effect of social proximity remained positive and significant (16.00, 
p<.05) and social proximity (squared) was negative and significant (-21.243, p<.05) indicating the 
operation of a quadratic effect, while status remained positive but only marginally significant (10% 
level). This result is particularly interesting because it seems to suggest that being too close to members 
of the evaluating audience might prove less advantageous for producers and even reduce their 
likelihood of being rewarded. We surmise that when audience members perceive that doubts could be 
cast on the fairness of their judgments and their reputation is then at stake, they actually refrain from 
rewarding producers who are socially very close to them. Especially in context like ours where small 
world features can be observed (e.g., most of the advertising firms are located in Oslo and 
professionals interact at multiple levels besides and beyond working together), alleged vested interest 
in rewards allocation decisions is likely to have enduring negative reputational effects. Although this 
is beyond the scope of the present study, future research might find this issue worthy of further 
investigation. In the discussion section, we further elaborate on this unexpected finding and suggest 
directions for fleshing out its implications.  
Finally, we investigated the influence on the allocation of rewards of status and social proximity 
by estimating the average treatment effect of these three mechanisms on the likelihood of being 
rewarded in our advertising project population. We estimated the average treatment effect (ATE) from 
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our observational data using the nearest-neighbor matching technique. This technique imputes the 
missing potential outcome for each subject (here project) using an average of the outcomes of similar 
subjects (projects) that received the treatment. The average treatment effect is then computed by 
taking the average of the difference between the observed and imputed potential outcomes for each 
subject (project). To match projects, we calculated the Mahalanobis distance similarity measure for all 
projects based on our set of covariates excluding for each treatment model the variables for the 
competing mechanisms. We first defined the treatment level for each project based on our status 
variable. Specifically, each project was treated using .2 cut-off rule. All projects with a value of status 
>= .2 were assigned the value of 1 (treated) while those with status < .2 were assigned the value of 0 
(untreated). To adjust for sample bias when matching on more than one continuous covariate, we 
specified a bias-corrected estimator to ensure consistent nearest neighbor estimations (Abadie & 
Imbens, 2006, 2011). We then estimated the average treatment effect using robust standard errors.  
The results presented in Table 4 show a significant positive ATE for treatments greater than 
the chosen cutoff value. In Model 8, the ATE for status >= .2 is .633 (p<.01). We also estimated the 
ATE of the social proximity variable using the cutoff rule of .5 to identify the treatment group. The 
results are reported in Model 9 and show a positive (2.379) and significant (p<.01) ATE for social 
proximity >= .5. Although we cannot claim causality, the results of these analyses strengthen the 
confidence in the finding that our variables of theoretical interest influence the allocation of rewards. 
<Insert Table 3 and 4, and Figure 1 about here> 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
A growing body of research following the Bourdieuian tradition suggests that acts of consecration do 
not occur in a social void, but are instead embedded in patterns of relationships and shaped by 
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audiences (e.g., peers, critics, etc.) that grant or deny distinction to competing candidates (Allen & 
Parsons, 2006; Rossman et al., 2010; Cattani et al., 2014). In line with this view, the present study 
demonstrated how the consecration of cultural producers’ work in advertising award ceremonies is a 
function of their status and their social distance from the audience members who evaluate them—an 
idea that has been advanced (e.g., Lamont, 2012) but has remained largely unattended by social 
scientists. Especially in settings in which the assessment of quality is uncertain, audience members rely 
on judgment devices to discriminate among candidates.  
The present study exposes two such devices, status and social capital, thus contributing to the 
scholarly debate on social evaluations in organizational life (George et al., 2016: 10). First, unlike 
prevailing accounts of status-based mechanisms that look at pre-consumption preferential treatment 
of high status candidates, we show how preferential allocation of rewards may also result from 
audience members’ post-consumption assessment of high-status candidates. Status considerations, in 
other words, remain salient even after audience members observe candidates’ performance and its 
quality (Washington & Zajac, 2005). Second, we show that the outcome of the evaluation of 
candidates’ work is also a function of their distance to the audience members who evaluate them—an 
idea that has been previously advanced but, surprisingly, has remained largely unattended among social 
scientists. Contrary to our expectations pointing to the prestige catalyzing effect of audience-candidate 
proximity in the underlying social structure, the analyses brought attention to the potential occurrence 
of countervailing proximity-related processes. Although we found that for the majority of projects 
consecration choices are patterned along relational lines, our evidence also shows that the probability 
of consecration choices favoring the “connected candidates” declines as the social distance between 
audience members and producers diminishes significantly. We offer two tentative observations to 
interpret this unexpected result, which seems to suggest the existence of alternative mechanisms to 
those consistent with a purely Bourdieusian account of peer-based evaluative outcomes. First, social 
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proximity might operate as a double edged-sword if the audience-candidate relationship becomes so 
salient to raise suspicions of authenticity, thus yielding reputational concerns that inhibit rather than 
promote favorable evaluation on the part of the audience. This point dovetails with Bourdieu’s classic 
understanding of the “disinterestedness” ideal as a key driver of authenticity in cultural fields (Shymko 
& Roulet, 2017). In ostensibly meritocratic cultural settings characterized by strong vocational drive 
and professional ethos (Heinich, 2009), the suspicions stemming from alleged transgressions of this 
ideal may be particularly severe for one’s reputation, thus explaining the observed marginally 
decreasing and ultimately negative effect of audience-candidate social proximity on recognition 
outcomes. Second and related to the previous point, one crucial characteristic of all recognition 
processes – and of award-based consecration choices in tournament rituals in particular – is that the 
capacity to consecrate “the best” will itself be considered more credible if recognition is granted based 
on undisputable criteria, however subjective they may be. In fact, ideally, as pointed out by Heinich 
(2009, p. 94), “In a ‘sphere of justice’ based on merit, solidarity grounded on proximity (be it that of 
family, friendship, community) should have no place at all: excellence would be the only criterion for 
choice.” To the extent that decreasing audience-candidate social distance heightens vulnerability to 
criticism, relationships that may be publicly perceived as structuring the awarding process can 
jeopardize the authoritativeness of the award as a fair form of recognition, so threatening the viability 
of the tournament ritual itself. This too might account for the existence of negative returns to social 
proximity. While of course these observations are no more than conjectures at this stage, we are 
persuaded that it is important for future investigations to become attentive to the potentially non-
monotonic dynamics underlying the relationship between social distance and recognition in peer-
based evaluative settings such as the “rite of consecration” (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 117) examined in the 
present study.  
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Evaluation is an important aspect of knowledge production because standards of excellence 
are defined and reproduced through evaluative processes (Bourdieu, 1984). Since audience members’ 
evaluations construct prestige hierarchies and are also consequential for field evolution, the processes 
by which cultural producers are selected and rewarded embody rules of merit as well as vested 
interests, social objectives as well as identity-based motifs (Lamont, 2009). Our findings extend work 
on the social processes of evaluation by demonstrating that social distance between audience members 
and cultural producers is important to understand how audience members allocate symbolic capital—
a hypothesis suggested but heretofore under-investigated empirically by social analysts. Our results 
suggest that far from just error or statistical discrimination (e.g., gender, race, etc.), the residual term 
of reward allocation decisions in tournament rituals also contains social connections between audience 
members and candidates. Incorporating measures of these relationships may help account for some 
unexplained variance in models that seek to predict the recipient of the material or symbolic resources 
through which audiences routinely honor deserving cultural producers. As we noted before, data issue 
could partly explain why more systematic investigation of the influence of interpersonal relationships 
is still lacking: precise information about relationships between audience members and candidates is 
very difficult to obtain, especially for large samples and even more so over time. The challenge for any 
study that aims to track direct and indirect connections through prior joint experience – the approach 
pursued in our study – is to collect detailed information on the career histories of both audience (jury) 
members and candidates (advertising professionals). In this sense, the unique nature of our data 
represents an important strength of the paper. 
In cultural fields, the allocation of rewards often takes place in ceremonies known as 
tournaments rituals (Appadurai, 1986; Lukes, 1975) where awards and honors are bestowed on cultural 
producers through the selective judgment of worth. Tournament rituals have a distinct and 
recognizable symbolic structure that, in some culturally defined way, is removed from the routines of 
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economic life, usually taking the form of a public spectacle (Anand & Watson, 2004). Participation in 
tournament rituals is both a privilege granted to influential social actors in an organizational field and 
an instrument of status contests among them. By employing social network theory and analytic tools 
to expose the influence of social distance between evaluators and candidates on the outcomes of these 
ceremonies, our study also seeks to respond to recent calls from tournament theorists who have voiced 
the need to be more sensitive to the social context in which tournament rituals take place. As Connelly 
et al. (2014: 36) noted, incorporating “constructs and relationships from social network theory could 
help place tournaments more squarely into their contexts.” Many other evaluative contexts beyond 
award competitions such us employee promotion, compensation decisions, grant proposals, staffing 
choices resemble tournaments (Jensen & Kim, 2015). Our analysis illustrates the importance of 
focusing more explicitly on the social fabric that shapes the rewards allocation processes that operate 
within these settings. Future studies could further unpack the structure of this fabric, providing more 
granular measures of the different types of “social intercourses” (Blau, 1977) that may envelope the 
audience-candidate evaluative interface. For example, focusing on approaches based on structural 
cohesion – i.e., co-presence of audience and candidate members in structurally cohesive regions of the 
collaborative network (absent direct collaboration) – seems a viable possibility.  Another interesting 
research opportunity afforded by the type of data we employed would be to examine the extent to 
which awarding choices map onto reciprocation dynamics. Reciprocity, the giving of gifts to another 
in return for gifts received, is also a distance-reducing mechanism between any two parties involved 
in a social exchange. As summarized by Sherry (1983, p. 158), “The giving of gifts can be used to 
shape and reflect social integration (i.e., membership in a group) or social distance (i.e., relative 
intimacy of relationships).” As an example, take the hypothetical audience-candidate dyad composed 
by A(udience) and C(andidate). If A rewards C, C’s perception of the benevolence of A’s action 
increases. As such, C will feel closer to A, thereby fostering social bonding and reciprocation. 
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Examining the extent to which this and/or other similar finer-grained manifestations of social distance 
shape consecration choices in peer-based tournaments is a fruitful avenue for future inquiry.   
Several questions merit additional investigation. First, while we focused on peer-based 
recognition, recognition can also originate from public acclaim or critical evaluation (Bourdieu, 1993). 
For instance, in the U.S. feature-film industry, peers and critics are organized into distinct awarding 
organizations that reveal their preferences in annual ceremonies that play a critical role in constructing 
prestige hierarchies. The allocation of honors and awards, therefore, reflects the selective judgments 
of two distinct aesthetic logics embedded in the world of professional criticism and the world of film 
(Cattani et al., 2014), with obvious implications for how honors and awards are allocated, and prestige 
hierarchies created. This raises the question of whether and how the network effects are likely to 
change when multiple audiences, each applying different evaluation criteria, evaluate candidates’ work. 
Second, the finding that candidates’ distance and positive ties to audience members have a combined 
stronger effect on the likelihood of being rewarded than does their status suggests that the positive 
effects of status may be more circumscribed than previously thought. An interesting extension of our 
study would be to establish whether status and social ties interact, particularly whether social distance 
to audience members attenuate the importance of status as a judgment device in peer evaluation. These 
are but some of the many questions that future research could explore in greater depth. 
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 
1. Allocation of rewards 1.078 1.730 
2. Project size 7.024 3.816 
3. Project sophistication .226 .559 
4. Median experience 3.529 3.990 
5. Competitive intensity 15.369 5.960 
6. Conflict of interest .436 .496 
7. Prior jurors on project .113 .344 
8. Prior positive co-experience .261 .439 
9. Status .439 .402 
10. Social proximity .255 .075 
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Table 2 – Correlation Coefficients 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Allocation of rewards 1          
2. Project size .29 1         
3. Project sophistication .23 .38 1        
4. Median experience .07 -.08 -.04 1       
5. Competitive intensity -.22 -.06 -.01 -.01 1      
6. Conflict of interest .19 .18 -.03 .17 -.09 1     
7. Prior jurors on project .08 .14 .01 .13 -.07 .24 1    
8. Prior positive co-experience .19 .27 .16 .20 -.03 .55 .16 1   
9. Status .24 .35 .17 .26 -.05 .28 .14 .38 1  
10. Social proximity .24 .28 .17 .34 .02 .44 .23 .53 .57 1 
 
Condition number = 9.90 
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Table 3. Generalized linear models (clustered on contest/month) 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
  Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Project size   .075** .060** .071** .061** .056** 
    (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Project sophistication   .362** .348** .310** .310** .283** 
    (.09) (.10) (.09) (.09) (.10) 
Median experience   .026 .008 .005 -.004 -.005 
    (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Competitive intensity   -.069** -.066** -.070** -.069** -.069** 
    (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Conflict of interest   .399* .364* .306† .310† .270 
    (.17) (.17) (.17) (.17) (.17) 
Prior jurors on project   -.088 -.080 -.140 -.123 -.149† 
    (.14) (.15) (.14) (.15) (.14) 
Prior positive co-experience   .102 -.011 -.124 -.164 -.146 
    (.15) (.16) (.16) (.17) (.17) 
Status 1.088**   .656**  .490* .433† 
  (.17)   (.20)  (.22) (.22) 
Social proximity  5.270**   4.072** 3.201** 16.000* 
   (.81)   (1.02) (1.06) (6.35) 
Social proximity (squared)       -.21.243* 
        (10.73) 
Constant -2.689** -3.544** -2.182** -2.297** -2.987** -2.900** -4.593** 
  (.12) (.23) (.24) (.25) (.29) (.29) (.79) 
N 654 654 654 654 654 654 654 
Log pseudolikelihood -1185.30 -1190.49 -1099.59 -1084.77 -1082.72 -1075.53 -1068.27 
AIC 2374.61 2384.98 2215.18 2187.55 2183.45 2171.06 2158.53 
**p < .01, *p < .05, †p < .10                 
Point counts clustered on contest month               
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Figure 1. Percentage Change in Odds of Receiving an Accolade (Exponentiated 
Standardized Coefficients) for 1 StdDev Variation in the Variables 
 
Note: Changes in the odds of receiving an accolade are shown for a one-standard deviation change in 
the variables. The changes in odds are calculated based on exponentiated standardized coefficients 
from Model 8 in Table 3 with all control variables, the status variable, the social distance variable, and 
the positive ties variable to allow for comparison. 
 
 
Table 4. Matching Using Near Neighbor Estimation 
 
  Model 8 Model 9 
  Status Social proximity 
   >= .2 >= 0.5 
ATE .633** 2.379** 
  (.18) (.82) 
AI robust standard errors   
*p < .05, **p < .01   
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